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Abstract
In this paper we present tableau-style proof theories for some modal extensions of two paraconsis-
tent propositional logics: RM3, which allows for truth value gluts, and the weaker BN4, which also
allows for truth value gaps. These proof theories are shown to be sound and complete with respect
to their corresponding semantics. For comparison, we then present some Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tions of these systems proposed by Lou Goble, and bring out some of the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of these vis-a`-vis our tableau systems.
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1 Introduction
Modal logics are logics that formalize various notions of necessity and pos-
sibility (alethic, deontic, epistemic, temporal, etc.). Paraconsistent logics
are logics which, unlike e.g. classical and intuitionist logics, reject explosion
(A,¬A/B) and thus can be used to formalize inconconsistent but non-trivial
bodies of information. There are numerous reasons for combining these two
types of logics. For example, classically-based deontic logics typically 2 vali-
1 Email:mcgin017@umn.edu
2 We say “typically” because there are classically-based deontic logics (constructed in non-
standard ways) that reject deontic explosion. (See, e.g. [6], [7], [8], [12], [11], [15].) However,
any normal modal logic interpreted as a deontic logic validates deontic explosion. Worse,
any normal modal logic containing the “D” axiom, OA → ¬O¬A, validates deontic hyper-
explosion (OA,O¬A/B).
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date the problematic principle of deontic explosion (OA,O¬A/OB), according
to which conﬂicting obligations render everything obligatory; paraconsistent
deontic logics do not. 3 As another example: some paraconsistent epistemic
logics arguably provide a solution to Fitch’s “knowability paradox” [4], which
purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. 4
In “Paraconsistent Modal Logic” [9], 5 Lou Goble presents Hilbert-style
axiomatizations of some modal extensions of the paraconsistent logics RM3
(which allows for truth value “gluts,” i.e. sentences that are both true and
false) and the weaker BN4 (which also allows for truth value “gaps,” i.e. sen-
tences that are neither true nor false), 6 and shows these axiomatizations to
be sound and complete with respect to their corresponding semantics. In this
paper, we present tableau-style proof theories for these systems, and demon-
strate their soundness and completeness with respect to the corresponding
semantics.
For comparison, we then present Goble’s axiomatizations of the systems,
bringing out some of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these
vis-a`-vis our tableau systems.
2 Semantics
Our object language, L, is Atom = {pi : i ∈ N} closed under ¬, ∧, →, and
.∨, ↔, and  are deﬁned in the usual ways. We use Σ, ∆ to range over
subsets of L.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [KN4 model] A KN4 model is a triple 〈W,R, v〉, where W is
a non-empty set, R ⊆ W 2, and v : Atom ×W 	→ ℘{1, 0}. v is extended to
v¯ : L ×W 	→ ℘{1, 0} as follows. For all p ∈ Atom, A,B ∈ L, w ∈ W :
3 Paraconsistent deontic logics are presented and discussed in, e.g. [3], [5], [10], [11], [13].
4 Attempts to resolve the knowability paradox by appeal to paraconsistent epistemic logics
are found in, e.g., [1], [17].
5 Goble has graciously granted me permission to cite, and to quote from, this as-yet un-
published paper.
6
RM3 and BN4 are presented in [2].
C. McGinnis / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 143 (2006) 141–157142
v¯(p, w) = v(p, w)
1 ∈ v¯(¬A,w) ⇔ 0 ∈ v¯(A,w)
0 ∈ v¯(¬A,w) ⇔ 1 ∈ v¯(A,w)
1 ∈ v¯(A ∧B,w) ⇔ 1 ∈ v¯(A,w) and 1 ∈ v¯(B,w)
0 ∈ v¯(A ∧B,w) ⇔ 0 ∈ v¯(A,w) or 0 ∈ v¯(B,w)
1 ∈ v¯(A → B,w) ⇔ 1 ∈ v¯(A,w)⇒ 1 ∈ v¯(B,w); and
0 ∈ v¯(B,w)⇒ 0 ∈ v¯(A,w)
0 ∈ v¯(A → B,w) ⇔ 1 ∈ v¯(A,w) and 0 ∈ v¯(B,w)
1 ∈ v¯(A,w) ⇔ ∀w′(wRw′ ⇒ 1 ∈ v¯(A,w′))
0 ∈ v¯(A,w) ⇔ ∃w′(wRw′ and 0 ∈ v¯(A,w′))
Here, of course, 1 represents truth and 0 represents falsity. Note that, breaking
from the “classical” tradition, we do not equate truth with non-falsity, nor
falsity with non-truth.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [KM3 model] A KM3 model is just like a KN4 model except
that it precludes gaps, i.e. it requires that for all p ∈ Atom and w ∈ W,
1 ∈ v(p, w) or 0 ∈ v(p, w). It is easy to show that the exclusion of gaps in
KM3 extends to all elements of L, i.e. for all KM3 models 〈W,R, v〉, w ∈ W,
A ∈ L : v¯(A,w) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [semantic consequence] A is a semantic consequence of Σ in
KN4 (in symbols, Σ KN4 A) iﬀ for all KN4 models 〈W,R, v〉 and all w ∈ W ,
if 1 ∈ v¯(B,w) for all B ∈ Σ, then 1 ∈ v¯(A,w). We write KN4 A to abbreviate
∅ KN4 A. Semantic consequence for KM3 is deﬁned in the same way, but
with respect to KM3 models. (Since all KM3 models are KN4 models, KN4 ⊆
KM3.)
KN4 is to BN4, and KM3 is to RM3, as the familiar modal logic K is to clas-
sical propositional logic (CPL): just as CPL is precisely the non-modal fragment
of K, BN4 (RM3) is precisely the non-modal fragment of KN4 (KM3). The
following graph illustrates the inclusion relations between these six systems:
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BN4 −→ KN4
↓ ↓
RM3 −→ KM3
↓ ↓
CPL −→ K
The following are some restrictions that may be placed on the R relation.
For all w,w′, w′′ ∈ W :
(r) reﬂexivity wRw
(s) symmetry wRw′ ⇒ w′Rw
(t) transitivity wRw′ ⇒ (w′Rw′′ ⇒ wRw′′)
(i) seriality ∃w′.wRw′
(n) near-reﬂexivity ∃w′.w′Rw ⇒ wRw
(e) euclidicity wRw′ ⇒ (wRw′′ ⇒ w′Rw′′)
We denote extensions of KN4 and KM3 by adding lower case letters to the
end of the system name. For example, KN4in is the extension of KN4 that
is obtained by requiring that R be serial and near-reﬂexive; and KM3r is the
extension of KM3 that is obtained by requiring that R be reﬂexive. 7 We will
say that a system is an “R-extension” of KN4 iﬀ it is the result of adding one
or more of our six conditions on R to KN4 (and similarly for KM3).
Semantic consequence for these extensions of KN4 and KM3 is deﬁned, as
one would expect, as truth preservation at all worlds in all relevant models.
For example, Σ KN4rs A iﬀ for all KN4rs models 〈W,R, v〉 and all w ∈ W , if
1 ∈ v¯(B,w) for all B ∈ Σ, then 1 ∈ v¯(A,w).
Note that we have speciﬁed 128 (= 2 × 26) distinct semantical systems
(though some of these, e.g. KN4r and KN4er, deﬁne equivalent consequence
relations).
3 Tableaux
In deﬁning our tableau systems, we adopt some of the techniques of [14].
Deﬁnition 3.1 [initial list] An initial list for an inference Σ/A is any list of
7 Goble uses a more syntactocentric nomenclature, e.g. using ‘KN4.DU’ to denote KN4en.
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the form
B0 0+
...
Bn 0+
A 0−
where {B0, · · · , Bn} ⊆ Σ. We use I(Σ/A) to denote the set of all initial lists
for Σ/A.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [maximal initial list] Where Σ = {B0, · · · , Bn}, the maximal
initial list for Σ/A, Im(Σ/A), is
B0 0+
...
Bn 0+
A 0−
Deﬁnition 3.3 [basic rules] Our basic tableau rules, the elements of Basic,
are as follows:
[¬¬]
¬¬A x±
A x±
[∧+]
A ∧ B x+
A x+
B x+
[∧−]
A ∧B x−
A x− B x−
[¬ ∧+]
¬(A ∧ B) x+
¬A x+ ¬B x+
[¬ ∧ −]
¬(A ∧B) x−
¬A x−
¬B x−
[→ +]
A → B x+
A x− B x+
¬B x− ¬A x+ ¬B x− ¬A x+
[→ −]
A → B x−
A x+ ¬B x+
B x− ¬A x−
[¬ →]
¬(A → B) x±
A ∧ ¬B x±
[+]
A x+
xy
A y+
[−]
A x−
xi
A i−
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[¬+]
¬A x+
xi
¬A i+
[¬−]
¬A x−
xy
¬A y−
The basic import of the rules is this: If a branch contains nodes of the forms
appearing above the horizontal line, it can be extended to include nodes of
the forms appearing below the horizontal line. Vertical lines indicate that the
branch is to be split. In these rules, x and y are any natural numbers; i is a
natural number that is new to the branch. We use ‘±’ to condense rules in an
obvious way; e.g. [¬ →] is a condensation of the following two rules:
[¬ → +]
¬(A → B) x+
A ∧ ¬B x+
[¬ → −]
¬(A → B) x−
A ∧ ¬B x−
A node of the form A x+ indicates that (on the branch we are assuming) A
is true at the world corresponding to x. A node of the form A x− indicates
that A is not true at the world corresponding to x. A node of the form ¬A
x+ indicates that ¬A is true, i.e. A is false, at the world corresponding to x.
A node of the form ¬A x− indicates that ¬A is not true, i.e. ¬A is not false,
at the world corresponding to x. (Keep in mind that in our semantics truth
= non-falsity and falsity = non-truth!)A node of the form xy indicates that
the world corresponding to x bears R to the world corresponding to y.
Deﬁnition 3.4 [closed branch] A branch of a KN4 tableau is closed just in
case nodes of the forms A x+ and A x− occur on it. In KM3 we have an
additional closure condition: A x− and ¬A x−.
Deﬁnition 3.5 [tableau] The set T (Σ/A) of tableaux for an inference Σ/A
is the smallest superset of I(Σ/A) such that if t ∈ T (Σ/A) and t′ is the
result of applying a tableau rule to an open (i.e. non-closed) branch of t, then
t′ ∈ T (Σ/A).
Deﬁnition 3.6 [maximal tableau] The set Tm(Σ/A) of maximal tableaux
for an inference Σ/A is the smallest superset of {Im(Σ/A)} such that if
t ∈ Tm(Σ/A) and t
′ is the result of applying a tableau rule to an open branch
of t, then t′ ∈ Tm(Σ/A).
Deﬁnition 3.7 [closed tableau] A tableau is closed iﬀ all of its branches are.
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Notation.
We write ‘×’ at the bottom of a branch to indicate that it is closed, and
‘↑’ to indicate that it is open (i.e. not closed).
Deﬁnition 3.8 [proof-theoretic consequence] A is a proof-theoretic conse-
quence of Σ in KN4, in symbols Σ KN4 A, iﬀ there is a closed KN4 tableau for
Σ/A. Similarly, Σ KM3 A iﬀ there is a closed KM3 tableau for Σ/A. (Since
all closed KN4 tableaux for Σ/A are closed KM3 tableaux for Σ/A, KN4 ⊆
KM3.)
Deﬁnition 3.9 [additional rules] We have the following additional rules for
extensions of KN4 and KM3: 8
[r]
A x±
xx
[s]
xy
yx
[t]
A x±
xy
yz
xz
[i]
A x±
xi
[n]
xy
yy
[e]
xy
xz
yz
Tableau systems for R-extensions of KN4 and KM3 are deﬁned as follows.
The rules for a system are Basic plus the additional rules corresponding to
the additional restrictions on R. For example, the set of rules for KN4in is
Basic ∪ {[i], [n]} and the set of rules for KM3r is Basic ∪ {[r]}. Four-valued
extensions (i.e. the ones whose names begin with ‘KN’) have the same closure
conditions as KN4. Three valued extensions (i.e. the ones whose names begin
with ‘KM’) have the same closure conditions as KM3.
Proof-theoretic consequence for these R-extensions of KN4 and KM3 is
deﬁned as one would expect. For example, Σ KM3e A iﬀ there is a closed
KM3e tableau for Σ/A.
Example 3.10 Here is a proof that (A → B),A KN4 B :
8 We include the ‘A’ in the rules [r], [t], and [e] in order to avoid inﬁnite tableaus.
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1. (A → B) 0+ initial list
2. ¬¬A 0+ ”
3. ¬¬B 0− ”
4. 01 2 [¬+]
5. ¬¬A 1+ ”
6. A 1+ 5 [¬¬]
7. ¬¬B 1− 3,4 [¬−]
8. B 1− 7 [¬¬]
9. A → B 1+ 1,4 [+]
10. A 1− B 1+ 9 [→ +]
11. ¬B 1− ¬A 1+ ¬B 1− ¬A 1+ ”
× × × ×
Note that the number column, justiﬁcation column, and ‘×’s are not oﬃcially
parts of the tableau.
Example 3.11 Here is a proof that A,¬A KM3r B :
1. A 0+ initial list
2. ¬A 0+ ”
3. B 0− ”
4. 00 3 [r]
5. A 0+ 1,4 [+]
6. ¬A 0+ 2,4 [+]
7. 01 3 [−]
8. B 1− ”
9. A 1+ 1,7 [+]
10. ¬A 1+ 2,7 [+]
11. 11 10 [r]
↑
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We can read a counterexample oﬀ of this open branch using the method of the
induced model (see deﬁnition 21 below). The induced model for this branch
is: 9 W = {w0, w1}; R = {〈w0, w0〉, 〈w0, w1〉, 〈w1, w1〉}; v(p0, w0) = v(p0, w1) =
{1, 0}; 1 /∈ v(p1, w1). It is easy to verify that in this model, 1 ∈ v¯(p0, w0)
and 1 ∈ v¯(¬p0, w0) but 1 /∈ v¯(p1, w0). Also, note that R is reﬂexive, as
required.
We now prove soundness and completeness for each of the systems we have
deﬁned.
Notation.
We let S stand for any of our systems, KN4+ for any R-extension of KN4,
and KM3+ for any R-extension of KM3.
Deﬁnition 3.12 [faithful] Let b be a branch of an S tableau. An S model
M = 〈W,R, v〉 is faithful to b iﬀ there is a mapping f : N 	→ W satisfying the
following conditions.
1. if xy is on b then f(x)Rf(y)
2. if A x+ is on b then 1 ∈ v¯(A, f(x))
3. if A x− is on b then 1 /∈ v¯(A, f(x))
We say that f shows M to be faithful to b.
Lemma 3.13 (soundness lemma) Let b be an open branch of an S tableau,
and let M = 〈W,R, v〉 be an S model that is faithful to b. If an S tableau rule
is applied to b, then M is faithful to at least one of the branches thereby
generated.
Proof. The proof is by cases. There are 18 cases to consider—one for each
tableau rule. We omit the details due to lack of space. 
Theorem 3.14 (soundness for KN4 and its R-extensions) Σ KN4+ A
only if Σ KN4+ A.
Proof. Suppose Σ KN4+ A. Then there is a KN4
+ model M = 〈W,R, v〉 and
w ∈ W such that 1 ∈ v¯(B,w) for all B ∈ Σ and 1 /∈ v¯(A,w). Clearly M is
faithful to each element of I(Σ/A). Moreover, by the soundness lemma, each
subsequent application of a KN4+ tableau rule to an element of I(Σ/A) will
yield at least one branch to which M is faithful. Thus every t ∈ T (Σ/A) has
at least one branch to which M is faithful. Let t ∈ T (Σ/A), and let b be a
branch of t to whichM is faithful. Suppose b is closed: then nodes of the forms
C x+ and C x− occur on b. Thus, since M is faithful to b, 1 ∈ v¯(C,w(x))
9 Note that we convert all schematic letters A, B, etc. to atomic formulas p0, p1, etc.
Otherwise we wouldn’t really be deﬁning a model.
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and 1 /∈ v(C,w(x)). (Contradiction.) Thus b is open. Thus every element of
T (Σ/A) has at least one open branch. Thus there are no closed tableaux for
T (Σ/A). Thus Σ KN4+ A. 
Theorem 3.15 (soundness for KM3 and extensions) Σ KM3+ A only if
Σ KM3+ A.
Proof. Just as for KN4+, except we now must take an additional closure con-
dition into account when showing that b is open. Suppose nodes of the forms
Cx− and ¬Cx− occur on b.Then, since M is faithful to b, 1 /∈ v¯(C,w(x)) and
0 /∈ v¯(C,w(x)), i.e. v¯(C,w(x)) = ∅. But this contradicts the fact that can be
no truth value gaps in a KM3+ model. 
Deﬁnition 3.16 [induced model] Let b be an open, complete branch of an S
tableau. The S model induced by b is the S model M = 〈W,R, v〉 such that
for all p ∈ Atom:
1. W = {wx : x is a natural number occurring on b}
2. R = {〈wx, wy〉 : xy occurs on b}
3. if p x+ is on b, then 1 ∈ v(p, wx)
4. if p x− is on b, then 1 /∈ v(p, wx)
5. if ¬p x+ is on b, then 0 ∈ v(p, wx)
6. if ¬p x− is on b, then 0 /∈ v(p, wx)
We assume some arbitrary but ﬁxed method of specifying any parameters
not determined by the above; this justiﬁes our speaking of “the” S model
induced by b. Strictly speaking we need to verify that the S model induced
by b really is an S model, but this is not diﬃcult.
Lemma 3.17 (completeness lemma) Let b be an open, complete branch of
a tableau, and let M = 〈W,R, v〉 be the model induced by b. Then:
1. if A x+ is on b, then 1 ∈ v¯(A,wx)
2. if A x− is on b, then 1 /∈ v¯(A,wx)
3. if ¬A x+ is on b, then 0 ∈ v¯(A,wx)
4. if ¬A x− is on b, then 0 /∈ v¯(A,wx)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of A. We omit the details due
to lack of space. 
Theorem 3.18 (completeness for ﬁnite Σ) For ﬁnite Σ, if Σ S A then
Σ S A.
Proof. Suppose Σ S A. Then there is no closed S tableau for Σ/A. Let t
be any open, complete, maximal S tableau for Σ/A, and choose some open
branch, b, of t. Let M = 〈W,R, v〉 be the S model induced by b. Since t
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is a maximal S tableau for Σ/A, B 0+ is on b for all B ∈ Σ. Also, A 0−
is on b. Thus, by the completeness lemma, 1 ∈ v¯(B,w0) for all B ∈ Σ and
1 /∈ v¯(A,w0). Thus Σ S A. 
In order to extend our completeness theorem to allow for inﬁnite Σ we will
appeal to compactness:
Theorem 3.19 (compactness) If Σ S A then there is a ﬁnite ∆ ⊆ Σ such
that ∆ S A.
The compactness of our systems follows more or less trivially from the fact
that (as Goble has shown) they are axiomatizable. However, we need not take
a detour through Goble’s axiomatizations to prove compactness; we can prove
it directly in terms of our tableaux, using a technique similar to that used in
[16, chap. III].
The unqualiﬁed completeness theorem now follows straightforwardly:
Theorem 3.20 (completeness) Where S is any of the logics we have de-
ﬁned herein, if Σ S A then Σ S A.
Proof. Suppose Σ S A. Then, by compactness, ∆ S A for some ﬁnite
∆ ⊆ Σ. Thus, by the ﬁnite completeness theorem, ∆ S A. Thus, by the
monotonicity of S, Σ S A. 
The following fact comes in handy, as it allows us to conclude that an
inference is invalid from the fact that there is a complete, open tableau for it.
Corollary 3.21 (all or nothing) If there is a complete, open S tableau for
Σ/A, then there is no closed S tableau for Σ/A.
Proof. Suppose there is an open, complete S tableau for Σ/A. Pick an open
branch, b, of this tableau. Let M = 〈W,R, v〉 be the S model induced by b.
By the completeness lemma and the deﬁnition of S tableaux for an inference,
1 ∈ v¯(B,w0) for all B ∈ Σ, but 1 /∈ v¯(A,w0). Thus Σ S A. Thus, by
the soundness theorem, Σ S A. Thus, by the deﬁnition of proof-theoretic
consequence, there is no closed S tableau for Σ/A. 
4 Axiomatics
For purposes of comparison, we now present Goble’s Hilbert-style axiomati-
zations of the systems presented in Section 2.
We’ll start with Goble’s axiomatization of KN4. For our basic (non-modal)
axioms, we have all instances of:
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(1) A → A
(2) (A ∧ B)→ A
(3) (A ∧ B)→ B
(4) ((A → B) ∧ (A → C))→ (A → (B ∧ C))
(5) A → (A ∨ B)
(6) B → (A ∨ B)
(7) ((A → C) ∧ (B → C)) → ((A ∨ B) → C)
(8) (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) → ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
(9) (A → ¬B) → (B → ¬A)
(10) ¬¬A → A
(11) (¬A ∧ B) → (A → B)
(12) ¬A → (A ∨ (A → B))
(13) A ∨ ¬B ∨ (A → B)
(14) A → ((A → ¬A) → ¬A)
(15) A ∨ (¬A → (A → B))
Our basic modal axioms are all instances of:
(K) (A → B) → (A → B)
(C) (A ∧B) → (A ∧ B)
(Bel) (A ∨ B) → (A ∨B)
(N) If A is an axiom then so is A
For rules we take ﬁrst:
(Adj) From A and B, infer A ∧B
(MP) From A and A → B, infer B
(Preﬁx) From A → B, infer (C → A) → (C → B)
(Suﬃx) From A → B, infer (B → C) → (A → C)
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These are not suﬃcient for completeness, however. Goble ﬁnds it necessary
to include an inﬁnite set of “extended modus ponens” rules, XMP, which is
deﬁned recursively as the smallest set of rules such that:
• All instances of the rule MP*, From (A∧(A → B)), infer (A∧(A → B))∧B,
are in XMP, and
• If a rule R is in XMP, then so are all the instances of CR, DR, NR, and
MR.
CR, DR, NR, and MR are deﬁned as follows. Given a rule R, From A, infer
B, let its disjunctive forms, DR, be: From C∨A, infer C∨B, for every formula
C. Likewise, let its conjunctive forms, CR, be: From C∧A, infer C∧B, and its
necessitative forms, NR, be: From A, infer B, and its possibilative forms,
MR, be: From A, infer B.
Referring to XMP Goble writes: “These rules are not pretty, and I would
rather not posit such a set of them, but they seem to be required, all because
of the absence of the theorem form of modus ponens, (A ∧ (A → B)) → B,
from BN4. I invite anyone to ﬁnd a more elegant formulation of the system.”
[9, p. 6]
Proof theoretic consequence is deﬁned in the usual way for axiomatic sys-
tems: Σ S A iﬀ there is a ﬁnite sequence of formulas 〈B1, · · · , Bn〉 such that
each Bi is either an element of Σ, an axiom of S, or follows from preceding
members of the sequence by a rule of S; and Bn = A.
Goble’s axiomatization of KM3 is quite a bit simpler, due to the fact that
KM3, unlike KN4, validates the theorem form of modus ponens.
For our basic (non-modal) axioms, we have all instances of:
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(1) A → A
(2) (A ∧ (A → B))→ B
(3) (A ∧ B)→ A
(4) (A ∧ B)→ B
(5) ((A → B) ∧ (A → C))→ (A → (B ∧ C))
(6) A → (A ∨ B)
(7) B → (A ∨ B)
(8) ((A → C) ∧ (B → C)) → ((A ∨ B) → C)
(9) (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) → ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
(10) (A → ¬A) → ¬A
(11) (A → ¬B) → (B → ¬A)
(12) ¬¬A → A
(13) (¬A ∧ B) → (A → B)
(14) ¬A → (A ∨ (A → B))
The modal axioms for KM3 are the same as for KN4. The rules are the
same as well, except that it is not necessary to include XMP in KM3; as Goble
demonstrates, all of the elements of XMP are derivable in KM3, thanks to the
fact that KM3 includes (A ∧ (A → B))→ B as a theorem.
Extensions of KN4 and KM3 are obtained, as one would expect, by adding
the standard axioms corresponding to the conditions on R:
(T) A → A reﬂexivity
(B) A → A symmetry
(4) A → A transitivity
(D) A → A seriality
(U) (A → A) near-reﬂexivity
(5) A → A euclidicity
For illustration’s sake, let’s look at an axiomatic proof that(A → B),A KN4
B. (We will help ourselves to an alternative form of contraposition, (A →
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B) → (¬B → ¬A), which is easily derived. We also condense some steps of
the proof. Note that the actual proof, sans shortcuts, is much longer.)
1. (A → B) premise
2. ¬¬A premise
3. ((A → B)→ (¬B → ¬A)) contraposition (N)
4. (A → B)→ (¬B → ¬A) 3 (K) (MP)
5. (¬B → ¬A) 1,4 (MP)
6. ¬B → ¬A 5 (K) (MP)
7. ¬¬A → ¬¬B 6 contraposition (MP)
8. ¬¬B 2,7 (MP)
5 Conclusion
We conclude by bringing out some of the comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of our tableau systems vis-a`-vis Goble’s axiomatizations.
There are ﬁve main factors to take into account when comparing proof
theories for a given logical system (or set of related systems):
• Simplicity. How complicated is the proof theory?
• Ease of use. How much work/ingenuity is required to construct proofs?
• Counterexamples. Does the proof theory provide a method of generating
counterexamples to invalid inferences?
• Insight. How much insight does the proof theory provide into the inferential
power of the system(s)?
• Metatheory. How diﬃcult it is to prove metatheorems (esp. soundness and
completeness)?
We consider each of these factors in turn.
Simplicity. Our tableau systems are simpler than Goble’s axiomatizations,
especially with respect to KN4 and its R-extensions. It is particularly inter-
esting to note that while the axiomitizations of the four-valued systems are
signiﬁcantly more complicated than the axiomatizations of the three valued
systems, the tableau systems for the four-valued systems are actually slightly
simpler than those for the three-valued systems. Advantage: tableaux.
Ease of use. Tableau proofs require no ingenuity to construct (a com-
puter could be programmed to construct them), though they can sometimes
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be tedious to construct. Axiomatic proofs on the other hand, often require
signiﬁcant ingenuity to construct and are almost always tedious to construct.
Advantage: tableaux.
Counterexamples. Our tableau systems provide a simple method of gener-
ate counterexamples to invalid inferences. Goble’s axiomatic systems do not
provide any such method. Advantage: tableaux.
Insight. Goble’s axiomatizations have a clear advantage over our tableau
systems here. In general, the biggest shortcoming of tableau proof theories is
the fact that they do not illustrate much more about the logic than one could
glean from the semantics alone. Advantage: axioms.
Metatheory. The soundness and completeness proofs for our tableau sys-
tems are roughly equal in length and diﬃculty. Soundness for Goble’s axiom-
atizations is more or less trivial, while completeness is rather involved and
diﬃcult. Advantage: tableaux (by a hair).
Tableaux have the advantage in four of the ﬁve factors we have considered.
Of course, we are not taking into account the relative weighting of these fac-
tors. Still, we think that overall, our tableau systems compare quite favorably
with Goble’s axiomatizations. It is nice to have both types of systems at our
disposal, though.
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